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I. INTRODUCTION
With today’s American society consisting of the most racially diverse
citizenry in the country’s history,1 it is not hard to imagine why raceconscious university admissions programs have created a hotly contested
controversy.2 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution guarantees equal treatment under the laws to
each citizen, regardless of race, and provides that “No State shall . . . deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”3
Thus, public universities administering racial preference in extending
enrollment offers exists in a state of uneasy tension with the Equal
Protection Clause, as members of certain races—and not others—are given
preference in the admissions process on the basis of race.4 The Supreme
Court of the United States recently decided the case of Fisher v. University
of Texas at Austin (hereinafter “Fisher II”), in which the Court upheld as
constitutionally permissible a public university’s consideration of race in its
admissions program.5
Fisher II is just one in a series of cases in which race-conscious
university admissions programs have been reviewed by the Court. The
Court, in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, conclusively held
1. Francisco M. Negrón, Jr., Diversity is Dead. Long Live Diversity: The Racial Isolation Prong
of Kennedy’s Pics Concurrence in Fisher and Beyond, 24 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 99, 99 (2015-2016)
[hereinafter Negrón, Diversity is Dead].
2. Johnathan D. Glater, Debt, Merit, and Equity in Higher Education Access, 79 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 93 (2016) [hereinafter Glater, Debt, Merit, and Equity].
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. See Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214 (2016) [hereinafter Fisher
II].
5. Id.
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that race-conscious admissions programs are “reviewable under the
Fourteenth Amendment.”6 Though a university has a compelling interest in
promoting the educational benefits of diversity,7 Bakke required that a
university’s decision to use race-conscious admissions plans meet strict
scrutiny in order to be consistent with the Equal Protection Clause.8 In
Grutter v. Bollinger, the Court reaffirmed the proposition that “student body
diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in
university admissions.”9 A university must specifically and narrowly tailor
its goals in achieving racial diversity.10
In Fisher II, the petitioner, a Caucasian female, applied for a seat in the
University of Texas at Austin’s 2008 freshman class and was rejected.11
She then challenged the University of Texas at Austin’s consideration of
race as part of its admissions program on the grounds that it “disadvantaged
her and other Caucasian applicants, in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause.”12 The Court ultimately held that the University of Texas at
Austin’s race-conscious admission plan was constitutionally permissible, as
it was narrowly tailored to pursue the University’s interest in promoting the
educational benefits that spring from student body diversity.13 Despite
language from the first instance of the case in Fisher (hereinafter “Fisher
I”), requiring a reviewing court to give a university no deference in
determining whether its goals are narrowly tailored in pursuing student
body diversity,14 the Court in Fisher II articulated that “considerable
deference is owed to a university in defining those intangible characteristics,
like student body diversity, that are central to its identity and educational
mission.”15
The dissent was highly critical of the majority’s application of the
restrictions set out in Fisher I, stating that the Court had granted the
University of Texas at Austin “blind deference . . .” in determining whether
its goals were narrowly tailored, as required by strict scrutiny.16
Furthermore, the dissent stated that the University of Texas at Austin’s

6. 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1979).
7. Id. at 314-15.
8. Id. at 299, 357.
9. 539 U.S. 307, 325 (2003) (The Court upheld the University of Michigan’s consideration of
race as part of its holistic review as constitutionally permissible).
10. Id. at 333 (citing Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908 (1996)).
11. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2207.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 2214.
14. Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2012) (citing Grutter, 539
U.S. at 333) [hereinafter Fisher I].
15. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2214.
16. Id. at 2216.
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goals were vague,17 concluding that the majority’s opinion constituted
“affirmative action gone wild.”18
Despite the decades of controversy surrounding the use of raceconscious plans in university admissions,19 Fisher II clarifies that such racebased considerations are here to stay, at least for the foreseeable future.20
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Prior to the 1997 academic year, the University of Texas at Austin
(hereinafter “the University”) reviewed each applicant by taking into
consideration the following two criteria: (1) an applicant’s SAT score and
high school performance, called an applicant’s “Academic Index” (AI); and
(2) consideration of an applicant’s race.21 “Preference was given to racial
minorities.”22 However, in response to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Hopwood v. Texas,23 the University
adopted a race-neutral admissions plan.24 This modified plan continued to
measure an applicant’s AI, but added a new element, the “Personal
Achievement Index” (PAI), which assigned a numerical score based on the
holistic review of an applicant.25 The PAI was made up of an applicant’s
“essays, leadership and work experience, extracurricular activities,
community service, and other ‘special characteristics’ that might give the
admissions committee insight into a student’s background.”26
Following the decision in Hopwood, the Texas legislature enacted the
“Top Ten Percent Law.”27 The Top Ten Percent Law required the
University to offer enrollment to any applicant who graduated in the top ten
percent of his or her high school graduating class.28 The goal of the law was
to increase minority admissions within the University.29 The University
17. Id. at 2223 (stating that “By accepting these amorphous goals as sufficient for [the University
of Texas at Austin] to carry its burden, the majority violates decades of precedent rejecting blind
deference . . .”).
18. Id. at 2232.
19. Graton, Debt, Merit, and Equity, supra note 2, at 93.
20. Todd Henderson, Symposium: What Proof Should We Demand to Justify Racist Policies?,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2016, 10:04 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-what-proof
-should-we-demand-to-justify-racist-policies/ [hereinafter Henderson, Symposium: What Proof Should
We Demand].
21. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2205.
22. Id.
23. See 78 F.3d 932, 934-35, 948 (5th Cir. 1999) (The University’s consideration of race was
declared unconstitutional, as it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
24. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2205.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.; see TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (West 2015).
28. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2205.
29. See Negrón, Diversity is Dead, supra note 1, at 107.
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implemented the Top Ten Percent plan in 1998.30 The University filled the
majority of the available seats in its freshman class through satisfaction of
the Top Ten Percent plan,31 and the remainder of the class was filled
through combined review of an applicant’s AI and PAI scores.32
The University utilized this plan until 2003, when it created the plan
pertinent to the case.33 Following the Court’s ruling in Grutter and Gratz v.
Bollinger,34 the University modified its admission plan for the final time.35
Grutter upheld the University of Michigan’s holistic review of its
applicants, taking into consideration race as a factor, but did not use a
mechanical allocation of points based on race.36 The University, after
finding that its admission of minority students had stagnated during the
Hopwood regime,37 modified its admission program to allow race to be
considered as a relevant factor.38 The University then adopted its current
admissions review program, which continued to admit 75% of applicants
through the Top Ten Percent plan, but also implemented holistic review to
fill the remaining 25% of the incoming class.39 The holistic plan used a
combination of an applicant’s AI and PAI scores, but also considered race
as a relevant factor.40 Under holistic review, the applicant was assigned a
“Personal Achievement Score” (PAS) in order to give the admissions
committee total insight into an applicant’s “special characteristics” that
made the applicant a unique candidate.41 These “special characteristics”
included:
the socioeconomic status of the applicant’s family, the
socioeconomic status of the applicant’s school, the applicant’s
family responsibilities, whether the applicant lives in a single-parent
home, the applicant’s SAT score in relation to the average SAT

30. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2205.
31. Id. at 2206 (The Top Ten Percent plan was ultimately capped to allow no more than 75% of
the freshman class to be filled through the plan).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.; see 539 U.S. 244, 279-80 (2003) (The Court in Gratz struck down the University of
Michigan’s admissions program, which allocated “predetermined points to racial candidates”).
35. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2206.
36. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337, 343-44.
37. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2205-06 (The University conducted a year-long study to determine
whether its admissions program was promoting student body diversity, concluding that its postHopwood race-neutral admission program was insufficient).
38. Id. (This plan followed in the wake of the decision in Grutter permitting consideration of race
in holistic review of applicants.).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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score at the applicant’s school, the language spoken at the
applicant’s home, and, finally, the applicant’s race.42
The University used the consideration of race as a “factor of a factor of
a factor” and claimed that race was introduced only in determining an
applicant’s PAS.43 Furthermore, all applicants whose total admission
score—based on AI, PAI, and PAS—was above a certain cut-off were
automatically admitted; admissions officers granting enrollment based on
the cut-off threshold were unaware of an applicant’s race when the
determination was made whether to admit an applicant.44 The University
further claimed that the consideration of race as a factor was “individualized
and contextual” in nature.45
In 2008, Abigail Fisher (hereinafter “Petitioner”), a Caucasian female
ranked outside the top ten percent of her high school graduating class,
applied for admission to the University and was rejected.46 Petitioner then
filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Texas, challenging the University’s use of race in its admissions program on
the grounds that the admissions plan violated the Equal Protection Clause.47
The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of the University,
finding no constitutional violation.48 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the District Court’s ruling based on the University’s “good
faith” effort to implement a race-conscious admissions plan in conformity
with the Equal Protection Clause.49 The Supreme Court of the United States
granted certiorari and held that the Court of Appeals’ use of a “good faith”
analysis was the incorrect constitutional standard to be applied when
reviewing whether a university’s consideration of race in its admissions
program is consistent with the Equal Protection Clause.50 The Court
instructed the Court of Appeals on remand to determine whether the
University’s race-conscious plan complied with the requirements of strict
scrutiny—the correct judicial standard to be applied—and whether the
University’s implementation of a race-conscious program was narrowly
42. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2206.
43. Id. at 2207.
44. Id.
45. Abigail Noel FISHER, Petitioner, v. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN, et al., 2015
WL 9919333 (U.S.), 40 (U.S. Oral. Arg., 2015) (Counsel for the University in responding to Justice
Alito’s question of whether it can be determined which students were admitted on the basis of race).
46. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2207.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.; see Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 631 F.3d 213, 247 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding
that the “University’s decision to reintroduce race-conscious admission was adequately supported by the
‘serious, good faith consideration’ required by Grutter”).
50. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2421.
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tailored to achieving the goal of pursuing student body diversity.51 On
remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed,52 and the Court granted certiorari to
hear the case for the second time in Fisher II.53
III. COURT’S DECISION AND RATIONALE
A. Majority Opinion by Justice Kennedy
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court and was joined by
Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Sotomayor;54 Justice Kagan
took no part in the decision.55 In Part II of the Court’s opinion, Justice
Kennedy analyzed the “three controlling principles” set forth by Fisher I in
determining whether a public university’s consideration of race in its
admissions programs is constitutionally permissible.56 First:
‘[r]ace may not be considered [by a university] unless the
admissions process can withstand strict scrutiny . . . Strict scrutiny
requires the university to demonstrate with clarity that its purpose
or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and
that its use of the classification is necessary . . . to the
accomplishment of its purpose.’57
Second, a university’s decision to pursue “‘the educational benefits that
flow from student body diversity . . .’” is largely a measure of “academic
judgment.”58 Due to such a decision being an “academic judgment,” a
university is given “some, but not complete, judicial deference . . .” and
must provide a “‘reasoned, principled explanation . . .’” based on the
University’s “‘experience and expertise . . .’” that it would benefit from
seeking student body diversity.59
Finally, the University must show that its method of using race-based
consideration in its admissions program was “narrowly tailored to achieve

51. Id. at 2421-22.
52. See Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 660 (5th Cir. 2014).
53. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2207.
54. Id. at 2204.
55. Id.; see Stephen Wermiel, SCOTUS for Law Students (Sponsored by Bloomberg Law):
Justice Kagan’s Recusals, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 9, 2012, 9:50 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/10/
scotus-for-law-students-sponsored-by-bloomberg-law-justice-kagans-recusals/ (Justice Kagan, acting as
then-Solicitor General, filed an amicus brief on behalf of the Department of Justice as the case was
pending in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and she recused herself from
deciding on the case).
56. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2207-08.
57. Id. at 2208 (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2418).
58. Id. (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419).
59. Id. (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419).
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the University’s permissible goals.”60 On this point, however, Justice
Kennedy clarified that Fisher I mandated that a university receive “no
deference . . . ,” and the University bears the ultimate burden in proving that
non-racial alternatives were insufficient or infeasible.61 Despite this burden,
the University was not required to show that every conceivable race-neutral
plan is insufficient, nor does narrow tailoring “‘require a university to
choose between maintaining a reputation for excellence [and] fulfilling a
commitment to provide educational opportunities to members of all racial
groups . . .’”62
Justice Kennedy began Part III of the opinion by highlighting the fact
that the University’s race-conscious admissions plan is unique and distinct
from other admissions plans reviewed by the Court in the past.63 The
University’s implementation of the Top Ten Percent Law in its admissions
review was the single most important factor in determining whether
Petitioner would be admitted to the University.64 Despite the weight and
importance of the Top Ten Percent plan in admissions determinations,
Petitioner never challenged it, and instead accepted it as a given premise.65
Because the University was not able to discontinue the use of the Top Ten
Percent plan, as it was mandated by law, combined with the fact that the
University had limited data on the success of its holistic review for
admissions, remand for further fact-finding would have produced marginal,
if any, results.66 Thus, according to Justice Kennedy, the Court was
necessarily limited to the narrow issue of “whether, drawing all reasonable
inferences in her favor, petitioner has shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that she was denied equal treatment at the time her application was
rejected.”67
After narrowing the issue, Justice Kennedy addressed—and ultimately
rebutted—each of Petitioner’s four arguments in Part IV of the opinion.68
Petitioner’s first argument was that the University had failed to “articulate[]
its compelling interest with sufficient clarity.”69 The University, according
to Petitioner, had failed to more precisely clarify the point at which it would
reach a “critical mass” of minority student enrollment.70 Justice Kennedy
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
2015 WL
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Id. at 2208-09.
Id. at 2209.
Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2209.
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Id. at 2210.
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made clear that achieving a “critical mass” of minority student enrollment
for the purposes of promoting diversity was not a measure that could be
reduced to pure numbers, quotas, or percentage-based systems.71 However,
Justice Kennedy stated that merely “asserting an interest in the educational
benefits of diversity writ large is insufficient. A university’s goals cannot
be elusory or amorphous—they must be sufficiently measurable to permit
judicial scrutiny of the policies adopted to reach them.”72
Justice Kennedy looked to University officials’ articulation of the
ultimate goals in using a race-conscious admissions plan to achieve student
body diversity. The University stated in its 2004 admissions plan that it
sought to realize “the destruction of stereotypes, ‘promot[ion of] crossracial understanding,’ the preparation of a student body ‘for an increasingly
diverse workforce and society,’ and the ‘cultivat[ion of] a set of leaders with
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry.’”73 Justice Kennedy stated that such
goals “mirror[ed] the ‘compelling interest’ this Court has approved in prior
cases . . .”74 and were concrete enough to establish that the University had
demonstrated a “‘reasoned, principled explanation . . .’” for its desire to
pursue such goals, as required by Fisher I.75
Concluding that Petitioner had failed to contest the sufficiency of the
University’s goals,76 Justice Kennedy next turned to Petitioner’s second
argument. Petitioner claimed that the University’s consideration of race in
its admissions program was unnecessary, as the University had already
achieved its desired “critical mass” of minority student enrollment by
2003.77 The University had implemented its race-conscious holistic review
plan after concluding that the level of minority enrollment had stagnated
during the Hopwood regime.78 It also found that minority students
experienced feelings of loneliness and isolation during this period.79
According to Justice Kennedy, these factors were persuasive in proving that
the University had not yet achieved its diversity goals.80

evident that, by 2004, the University had failed to reach “critical mass,” providing justification for the
University’s race-based plan).
71. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2210.
72. Id. at 2211.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419).
76. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2211.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2212 (The University studied the racial make-up of classes with five or more students
and found that, in 2002, 52% of such classes had no African-American students, and 12% of such classes
had no Hispanic students).
79. Id.
80. Id.
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Justice Kennedy next turned to Petitioner’s third argument, in which she
claimed that the University’s consideration of race in its admissions
program was unnecessary as its effects would be minimal.81 Justice
Kennedy again turned to a study undertaken by the University in 2003.
This study found that between 2003 and 2007, enrollment of AfricanAmerican and Hispanic students increased by 54% and 94% respectively as
a result of the University’s consideration of race in its holistic review
program.82 Justice Kennedy rebutted Petitioner’s third argument, stating
that such increases, although minor, did have a meaningful effect on the
University in promoting student body diversity.83 Moreover, the minor
impact of the consideration of race was not fatal to the narrow tailoring
analysis.84 In fact, according to Justice Kennedy, the small role that raceconsciousness played in the University’s admissions should be a “hallmark
of narrow tailoring, not evidence of unconstitutionality.”85
Justice Kennedy then addressed Petitioner’s fourth and final
argument—that race-neutral alternatives existed and could have been
implemented by the University before resorting to race-conscious
consideration in admissions decisions.86 In the wake of the Hopwood
decision, the University increased its outreach and scholarship efforts, as
well as its budget for recruiting events.87 None of these efforts, according to
the University, were successful in attaining the compelling interest in
achieving student body diversity.88 Furthermore, Petitioner recommended
that the University could have uncapped its Top Ten Percent plan.
However, Justice Kennedy pointed out that such plans, though appearing
race-neutral, are created for the singular goal of promoting minority
enrollment.89
In addition to demonstrating the race-conscious effect of the Top Ten
Percent plan, Justice Kennedy also emphasized that such plans rely on
academic performance in high school as a single metric, ignoring the
intangible characteristics of an applicant.90 For instance, according to
Justice Kennedy, such a plan would exclude talented athletes and musicians,
81. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2212.
82. Id. (The study showed that in 2003, 11% of Texas residents enrolled through holistic review
were Hispanic and 3.5% were African-American, compared to 16.9% and 6.8%, respectively, in 2007).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2212.
87. Id. at 2213.
88. Id.
89. Id. (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (Percentage plans are
“adopted with racially segregated neighborhoods and schools front and center stage . . . It is race
consciousness, not blindness to race, that drives such plans”).
90. Id.
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or talented students who struggled due to a family crisis before improving
their grades just to fall shy of the top ten percent.91 These plans are “blunt
instrument[s] . . . ,” according to Justice Kennedy, in “deep tension with the
goal of educational diversity as this Court’s cases have defined it.”92 Such
plans, by their very nature, exclude students who would otherwise
contribute to student body diversity.93 Furthermore, Justice Kennedy stated
that if universities utilized percentage plans in the method advocated by
Petitioner, such a practice would encourage parents to keep their students in
racially-identifiable schools and discourage students from taking more
challenging classes.94 Justice Kennedy then concluded his analysis of
Petitioner’s final argument, finding that Petitioner had failed to show any
workable race-neutral alternatives that could be utilized by the University in
achieving its goals; therefore, the University had met its burden in showing
that its race-conscious admissions policy was narrowly tailored when
Petitioner’s application was rejected.95
In concluding the opinion of the Court, Justice Kennedy emphasized the
fact that universities are “in large part defined by those intangible ‘qualities
which are incapable of objective measurement but which make for
greatness.’”96 Most importantly, however, Justice Kennedy articulated
that—due to these immeasurable qualities—courts owe considerable
deference to a university in determining such intangible characteristics that
make it unique.97 However, despite this deference, striking a balance
between the pursuit of diversity and the Constitution’s promise of equal
protection remains a challenge.98 It is up to universities to experiment in
striking this subtle balance.99
Despite considerable deference, and the University’s interest in striking
a balance between student body diversity and the Equal Protection Clause,
Justice Kennedy ended the opinion with a caveat: the University of Texas
has an ongoing responsibility to continually scrutinize the negative and
positive effects of its admissions program, and must continually reassess the
need for a race-conscious admissions policy.100

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2213.
Id. at 2213-14 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340).
Id. at 2213.
Id. at 2214 (citing Gratz, 539 U.S. at 304, n.10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
Id. (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2420).
Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2214 (citing Sweat v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950)).
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 581 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
Id. at 2214-15.
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B. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas joined in Justice Alito’s dissent,101 but wrote separately
to clarify his belief that the majority’s opinion was a radical departure from
the Court’s precedents.102 Moreover, Justice Thomas cited his own
concurring opinion from Fisher I to reaffirm the point that “a State’s use of
race in higher education admissions decisions is categorically prohibited by
the Equal Protection Clause.”103 Finally, Justice Thomas articulated that the
academic nature of promoting diversity does not change the constitutional
imperative and clarified that he would have overruled the Court’s decision
in Grutter.104
C. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Alito
Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, wrote
the 51-page dissenting opinion.105 Justice Alito began the dissent by
reviewing what the Court held in Fisher I.106 Justice Alito stated that Fisher
I required that the University meet strict scrutiny in determining the
necessity of a race-conscious admissions program as a compelling interest,
and that its goals in achieving such a purpose were narrowly tailored.107
The Court rejected in Fisher I the notion that deference was owed to the
University in meeting the strict scrutiny standard for adopting raceconscious admissions programs as a compelling interest.108 However,
Justice Alito emphasized that the University had failed to specify the
interests that would be furthered by implementing its race-conscious
admissions program, and that the majority had granted a “plea for deference
that we emphatically rejected in [Fisher I].”109
Justice Alito then elaborated on the University’s failure to prove that its
consideration of race actually added to classroom diversity.110 Furthermore,
the University failed to define when “critical mass” would be reached, as
such a measure is not an absolute number.111 Perhaps most striking,
however, was Justice Alito’s criticism of the University in claiming the Top
Ten Percent plan used by the University admitted the “wrong kind of
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
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Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2215 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2216 (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2411).
Id.
Id.
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Id.

11

Ohio Northern University Law Review, Vol. 43 [], Iss. 1, Art. 6

230

OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

African-American and Hispanic students . . .” as these students typically
come from poor high schools, and the University desires African-American
and Hispanic students from wealthy families.112 Such a premise was
founded on the idea that poor African-American and Hispanic students
admitted through the Top Ten Percent plan were not forced to compete with
white students—an “insulting stereotype not supported by the record.”113
Justice Alito went on to clarify that affirmative action was created to help
the disadvantaged; justifying consideration of race on the premise that
helping disadvantaged minorities hurts wealthy minorities is, according to
Justice Alito, “affirmative action gone wild.”114
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Alito reviewed the Court’s
jurisprudence regarding the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment on the
consideration of race in university admissions programs. Justice Alito made
clear that “racial neutrality is the driving force of the Equal Protection
Clause . . . .”115 Such racial classification can only survive constitutional
muster if it meets strict scrutiny and is narrowly tailored to achieving a
compelling interest;116 the government is required to clearly demonstrate
that its compelling interest is both substantial and constitutionally
permissible.”117
Justice Alito went on to state that the University had failed to
demonstrate with clarity its stated purpose in pursuing student body
diversity as a compelling interest.118 Justice Alito was highly critical of the
University’s “critical mass” formulation, stating that it was vague and
undefined.119 Such a nebulous goal is not permissible to justify the
consideration of race in admissions programs, and the University, therefore,
could not meet strict scrutiny.120 In addition, Justice Alito emphasized that
the majority ignored Court precedent by allowing the University to state
broadly and imprecisely its goals in achieving student body diversity, failing
to satisfy the strict scrutiny analysis.121 Although the Court’s precedents did
not require the University to articulate a specific number of minority
students enrolled, its proposed goals were simply not concrete enough to

112. Id.
113. Id. at 2217.
114. Id. at 2232.
115. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2220-21 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 518 (1989)).
116. Id. at 2221 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327).
117. Id. at 2222 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2418).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2222-23 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 735 (2007)).
121. Id. at 2223-24.
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withstand strict scrutiny.122 Justice Alito went on to say that “‘the
destruction of racial stereotypes, the promot[ion of] cross-racial
understanding, the preparation of a student body for an increasingly diverse
workforce and society, and the cultivat[ion of] a set of leaders with
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry . . .” are “laudabale goals . . .,” but are
too vague and lack the requisite specificity to withstand constitutional
scrutiny.123
Next, Justice Alito was highly critical of the University’s use of
demographic data, stating that the University had premised diversity on
mere racial census.124 Justice Alito pointed to such measuring of racial
minorities as racial balancing, which was held in Fisher I to be “‘patently
unconstitutional.’”125 Similarly, Justice Alito was highly critical of the
majority in not addressing the issue of fewer Asian-American students in
certain classes than there were Hispanic students, stating that the majority
must have found such disparate treatment “benign, since Asian-Americans
are overrepresented at [the University].”126 This information was based on
a classroom study that the University used in justifying its giving preference
to African-American and Hispanic students.127 Justice Alito articulated that
such unequal treatment between Hispanic students and Asian-American
students was discriminatory, and was a result of the University’s crude and
overly simplistic classroom study.128 Justice Alito further clarified that the
University considered all Asian-American students as a monolithic body,
failing to differentiate on the basis of ethnicity or nationality, constituting a
group consisting of 60% of the world’s population.129 Such a disparity was
difficult for Justice Alito to reconcile, as the majority found that the
University’s interest in preventing feelings of isolation and loneliness in
minority students was a compelling interest.130
Because of this
contradiction, and the University’s vague interest in preventing feelings of
isolation and loneliness, the University’s consideration of race in its
admissions program did not meet strict scrutiny.131

122. Id. at 2222-23.
123. Id. at 2223.
124. Id. at 2225.
125. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2225 (Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419).
126. Id at 2228.
127. Id. at 2226 (The small class study found that in classes with five or more students, 52% had
no African-American students, 16% had no Asian-American students, and 12% had no Hispanic
students. This university concluded after completion of the study, that it had not yet met its goal of
achieving classroom diversity.).
128. Id. at 2229.
129. Id. at 2229.
130. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2235-36 (Alito, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 2235.
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Justice Alito next addressed whether the University’s purpose and goal
in achieving student body diversity satisfied the narrowly tailored approach
mandated by Fisher I.132 Even if, as the University contended, Grutter only
required the statement of a “generic interest in the educational benefits of
diversity . . . ,” the University’s plan failed to be narrowly tailored in
achieving that interest.133 Justice Alito emphasized that the University
could implement a race-neutral holistic review, in addition to the top ten
percent plan, and would still be successful in enrolling students who could
contribute to dynamic diversity.134
Finally, Justice Alito turned to the majority’s three justifications for
straying from its traditional view of the strict scrutiny standard.135 First, he
called “dangerously incorrect . . .” the majority’s proposition that further
fact-finding would be useless, as there was only a three-year period of study
upon which to base whether its admissions plan unfairly disadvantaged
Petitioner at the time of her application for enrollment.136 However, this
goes against the strict scrutiny mandate from Fisher I, requiring a university
to bear the burden to show its race-neutral efforts were inadequate before it
can justify using a race-conscious program.137 The majority had essentially
granted the University a “three-year grace period for racial
discrimination.”138
The majority’s second justification for moving from the normal strict
scrutiny analysis, according to Justice Alito, was that the University could
not choose to discontinue the Top Ten Percent plan, and therefore, had no
interest in keeping data on the types of students enrolled through it.139
However, since the case had been in litigation since 2008, and Fisher I was
decided in 2012, the University was well aware of its burden to show that
race-neutral alternatives were not sufficient—lack of choice in
implementing the Top Ten Percent plan did not dispose of this burden.140
Justice Alito then made an interesting point: the University had been less
than forthright with its admission policies, as a 2014 investigation showed
132. Id. at 2236 (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2420 (stating narrow tailoring requires “a careful
judicial inquiry into whether a university could achieve sufficient diversity without using racial
classifications”)).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2236-37 (stating that such a race-neutral holistic review would still enable the
University to “admit the ‘star athlete or musician whose grades suffered because of daily practices and
training . . .” in rebutting the majority’s support of the University’s consideration of race to enroll
students who possess talents undetectable to grade point metrics).
135. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2238-39 (Alito, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 2239.
137. Id. (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2420).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2239-40 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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that the University frequently admitted well-connected students and
intentionally destroyed records leading back to this clandestine practice.141
The University claimed, however, that it was not in the practice of admitting
such “legacy” students.142 Moving along, Justice Alito criticized the
majority for excusing the University from producing records that could be
used to concretely measure the amount of minority students enrolled
through both the Top Ten Percent plan and holistic review.143
The third justification for limiting strict scrutiny from Fisher I was
more simple: the case had gone on for eight years and Petitioner had since
graduated from a different university. Such considerations may have
justified dismissal, but had no bearing on the merits of the case.144
Justice Alito then concluded his dissenting opinion, ultimately stating
that the majority’s decision was “remarkable—and remarkably wrong.”145
Justice Alito further clarified that strict scrutiny and narrow tailoring require
a university to prove with clarity its compelling interest in achieving student
body diversity; however, the University had failed to precisely show any
such goal.146 What was at stake, according to Justice Alito, was “whether
university administrators may justify systematic racial discrimination
simply by asserting that such discrimination is necessary to achieve ‘the
educational benefits of diversity,’ without explaining—much less proving—
why the discrimination is needed or how the discriminatory plan is well
crafted to serve its objectives.”147
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Introduction
The Court’s decision in Fisher II comes thirteen years to the day after
Justice O’Connor predicted in Grutter in 2003 that within twenty-five years,
the consideration of race in university admissions decisions would no longer
be necessary in this country.148 Roughly half-way into the life expectancy

141. Id. at 2240 (referencing the Kroll Report from 2014, which uncovered the secret practice of
university officials to override normal holistic review to admit politically connected individuals.
Records for students admitted in this manner were destroyed in an effort to hide any paper trail.).
142. Abigail Noel FISHER, Petitioner, v. UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN, et al., 2015
WL 9919333 (U.S.), 51 (U.S. Oral. Arg., 2015) (Counsel for the University: “University of Texas does
not do legacy, Your Honor”).
143. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2240-41 (Alito, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 2242.
145. Id. at 2243.
146. Id. at 2242-43.
147. Id.
148. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 310; see Stuart Taylor, Symposium: Extrapolating from Fisher – Racial
Preferences Forever, SCOTUSBLOG (June 23, 2016, 4:42 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/
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of affirmative action, however, Fisher II stands for the proposition that the
consideration of race in university admissions is here to stay.149 Both
Fisher I and Grutter recognized that achieving student body diversity
constitutes a compelling interest for public universities.150 In order for a
university to prove that its compelling interest is reconcilable with the Equal
Protection Clause, its consideration of race in admissions decisions must
meet “strict scrutiny” and be “narrowly tailored” in achieving its purpose.151
The Court’s jurisprudence also gives some, though not total, deference to a
university in determining that the consideration of race in academic
decisions is necessary for attaining student body diversity,152 but grants no
deference to the University in determining whether its goals in promoting
student body diversity satisfy the narrow tailoring analysis.153
The majority’s opinion in Fisher II seems to provide two departures
from this approach: (1) the requirements of strict scrutiny and narrow
tailoring have been relaxed; and (2) near complete judicial deference is
given to a university in implementing race-consciousness in its admission
decisions.154 This note will examine the majority’s analysis of the
University’s goals in complying with strict scrutiny and narrow tailoring in
the context of prior case law, discuss the expansion of judicial deference in
affirmative action decisions, and explore the potential future impact that
Fisher II may have on subsequent affirmative action litigation.
B. Discussion
1. Strict Scrutiny and Narrow Tailoring: Bakke and Beyond
Initially, it should be noted that Fisher I and Grutter still hold
precedential value as good case law in affirmative action jurisprudence.155
However, the majority’s opinion in Fisher II departs from these cases, as
well as others, by relaxing the restrictions on race-based university
admissions plans imposed by strict scrutiny and narrow tailoring.156
symposium-extrapolating-from-fisher-racial-preferences-forever/ [hereinafter Taylor, Symposium:
Extrapolating from Fisher].
149. See Taylor, Symposium: Extrapolating from Fisher, supra note 148.
150. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2418 (citing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 324 (“student body diversity is a
compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions”)).
151. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2208 (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2418-20).
152. Id. (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419).
153. Id. (citing Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419-20).
154. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2216, 2238-39 (Alito, J., dissenting).
155. See John Paul Schnapper-Casteras, Symposium: Moving Forward from Fisher II,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2016, 5:13 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-movingforward-from-fisher-ii/ [hereinafter Schnapper-Casteras, Symposium: Moving Forward].
156. See Elizabeth Slattery, Fisher v. UT-Austin and the Future of Racial Preferences in College
Admissions, 17 FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 22, 25 (2016) [hereinafter Slattery, Fisher v. UT-Austin].
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In 1978, the Court in Bakke invalidated an admissions program utilized
by the University of California, Davis, in which its medical school
admissions committee set aside sixteen out of 100 seats for
underrepresented minorities.157 However, the Court in Bakke permitted
universities to use racial preference in its admissions decisions to promote
“the educational benefits that flow from an ethnically diverse student
body.”158 The Court’s permission to consider race in admissions decisions
did not come without limitation. A university’s consideration of race must
meet strict scrutiny to be consistent with the express guarantees of the Equal
Protection Clause, for when government decisions “touch upon an
individual’s race or ethnic background, he is entitled to a judicial
determination that the burden he is asked to bear on that basis is precisely
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.”159
In 2003, the Court reaffirmed this position in Grutter, clarifying that
any use of racial classification in university admissions must meet strict
scrutiny in order to pass constitutional muster.160 Such racial classifications
are only permissible if they are narrowly tailored in achieving a compelling
governmental interest.161 The Court ultimately upheld the University of
Michigan Law School’s race-conscious holistic admissions review because
the benefits articulated by the University in administering its admissions
program promoted “cross-racial understanding . . .” leading to the “break
down [of] racial stereotypes . . . ,” helping students to “better understand
persons of different races.”162
Justice Kennedy in Fisher I then adopted this test as the correct judicial
standard to be applied when reviewing a university’s decision to implement
the consideration of race in its admissions policies.163 In Fisher I, Justice
Kennedy laid out the framework to be used as derived from Grutter and
Bakke, requiring that a university’s consideration of race in admissions
program meet strict scrutiny to be constitutionally permissible, be narrowly
tailored in achieving those ends, and be demonstrated with clarity and
specificity.164 These compelling interests served far beyond attaining
student body diversity, and facilitated the “lessening of racial isolation and
stereotypes . . .” while promoting “enhanced classroom dialogue . . . .”165
157.
158.
159.
160.
(1995)).
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
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Despite these express limitations, Justice Kennedy upheld in Fisher II
the University’s consideration of race without any seemingly concrete,
specific, or measurable goals.166 Justice Kennedy pointed out that merely
“asserting an interest in the educational benefits of diversity writ large is
insufficient. A university’s goals cannot be elusory or amorphous—they
must be sufficiently measureable to permit judicial scrutiny of the policies
adopted to reach them.”167 These goals included: “ending stereotypes,
promoting ‘cross-racial understanding,’ preparing students for ‘an
increasingly diverse workforce and society,’ and cultivating leaders with
‘legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry . . .’”168
Thus, put bluntly, so long as a university can articulate certain
“buzzwords” as justification for its adoption of race-based admissions
policies, its affirmative action plan will survive constitutional scrutiny.169
The problem with permitting such goals to satisfy narrow tailoring, as
Justice Alito pointed out, is that they are exactly the type of “amorphous,”
immeasurable goals that Justice Kennedy warned against in the majority
opinion.170 Moreover, Justice Kennedy deeply criticized vague goals in
Parents Involved, stating such abstract goals are “so broad and imprecise
that they cannot withstand strict scrutiny.”171
How, then, is a university to clearly articulate its goals in pursuing the
educational benefits of diversity? The upside to Justice Kennedy’s allowing
such goals to survive judicial scrutiny is that it alleviates the “catch-22”
problem universities often face in establishing diversity as a compelling
interest.172 It is impermissible for a university to implement racial balancing
in the form of percentage quotas or demographic comparisons,173 but
equally impermissible for a university to put forth “amorphous” or
immeasurable goals in its justification for pursuing the benefits that come
with diversity.174 With this in mind, Justice Kennedy’s opinion grants
universities some breathing room to pursue diversity for the “commonsense
proposition that diversity along various lines – including racial diversity –
yields significant educational benefits on college campuses.”175

166. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2223 (Alito, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 2211.
168. Id.
169. See Slattery, Fisher v. UT-Austin, supra note 156, at 25.
170. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2223 (Alito, J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 2223-24 (citing Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 785 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment)).
172. See Schnapper-Casteras, Symposium: Moving Forward, supra note 155.
173. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2208, 2210.
174. See id. at 2211.
175. See Schnapper-Casteras, Symposium: Moving Forward, supra note 155.
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2. Granting Considerable Deference to Universities in
Affirmative Action Review
Perhaps the most striking implication following the wake of the Court’s
decision in Fisher II is that universities are now granted “considerable
deference . . .” in determining whether a race-conscious admissions policy
is necessary for the promotion of student body diversity.176 Justice Kennedy
made it abundantly clear in Fisher I that a university’s decision to pursue
the benefits of diversity is substantially an “academic judgment to which
some, but not complete, judicial deference is proper.”177 However, “no
deference is owed when determining whether the use of race is narrowly
tailored to achieve the University’s permissible goals.”178
As stated earlier, Justice Kennedy looked to the goals the University
had laid out in order to achieve student body diversity, citing “ending
stereotypes, promoting ‘cross-racial understanding,’ preparing students for
‘an increasingly diverse workforce and society,’ and cultivating leaders with
‘legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry . . . .’”179 However, Justice Kennedy
relied on the University’s statement that it had tried race-neutral
alternatives—albeit unsuccessfully—in making its argument that its
consideration of race was narrowly tailored to achieve its permissible
goals.180 Moreover, Justice Kennedy rebutted Petitioner’s argument that the
University’s admissions policy was not narrowly tailored because the
consideration of race played a minimal impact on admissions decisions.181
However, Justice Kennedy relied on studies undertaken by the University as
well as anecdotal evidence offered by faculty and administrators, in
demonstrating that the University had not yet reached its “critical mass.”182
Justice Alito was highly critical of the majority’s opinion upholding the
University’s justification that it had not yet attained a “critical mass” of
minority student enrollment, as the University never defined, with any
reasonable amount of clarity or precision, when “critical mass” would be
reached.183 Justice Alito went on to say that the University would know it
when it sees that “critical mass” had been reached, stating “in other words:
Trust us.”184 According to Justice Alito, the majority granted the

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
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University’s “plea for deference—indeed, for blind deference—the very
thing that the Court rejected in Fisher I.”185
Although Justice Kennedy cited Fisher I in stating that no deference
was owed to a university when reviewing whether its goals were narrowly
tailored,186 in actuality, near complete deference was granted to the
University in allowing it to permit evidence from studies, as well as
anecdotal evidence, in arguing that its goals survived the narrow tailoring
analysis.187 It seems that by upholding immeasurable goals, couched in a
“critical mass”188 only identifiable by the University, the majority has
mandated that future courts will defer to a university in showing that its use
of race is narrowly tailored—a possibility that should have been precluded
by the Court’s clear rejection of such deference in Fisher I.189 Ultimately,
Justice Kennedy trusted the University on its word that “critical mass” had
not yet been attained.190
Because universities should be open to
experimentation in testing both the negative and positive effects of the
consideration of race in pursuing student body diversity,191 the strict
standard of giving no deference to universities when determining if its goals
are narrowly tailored has been abandoned in Fisher II.192

185. Id. at 2215.
186. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2208.
187. See Elizabeth Slattery, Symposium: A Disappointing Decision, but More Lawsuits Are on the
Way, SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2016, 1:13 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-adisappointing-decision-but-more-lawsuits-are-on-the-way/ [hereinafter Slattery, Symposium: A
Disappointing Decision] (stating that, although judges must not defer to a university when determining if
its use of race is narrowly tailored, this part “lost any teeth it may have had because Kennedy’s opinion
lets schools provide scant evidence”).
188. See Peter N. Kirsanow, Race Discrimination Rationalized Again, 2016 CATO SUP. CT. REV.
59, 63 (2016) (stating “[w]hat is critical mass? Who knows? It is a question that apparently does not
interest the majority. In failing to require UT Austin to define ‘critical mass,’ Justice Kennedy has given
universities broad license to engage in racial discrimination in pursuit of the elusive critical mass”).
189. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2223 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating that “Courts will be required to
defer to the judgment of university administrators, and affirmative action policies will be completely
insulated from judicial review”); see also Taylor, Symposium: Extrapolating from Fisher, supra note
148; Henderson, Symposium: What Proof Should We Demand, supra note 20; Kirsanow, supra note 188,
at 64 (stating “[t]hese [goals] are nothing more than fuzzy obfuscations. If these goals are considered
sufficiently specific to constitute a compelling interest, almost any goal short of ‘We want to engage in
blatant racial balancing’ will constitute a compelling interest”).
190. See Slattery, Fisher v. UT-Austin, supra note 156, at 25.
191. Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2214.
192. See id. at 2223 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also Taylor, Symposium: Extrapolating from
Fisher, supra note 148; Kirsanow, supra note 188, at 60 (stating that the Court’s “decision missed the
opportunity to enforce the narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny on which Justice Kennedy appeared
so keen in Fisher I”).
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3. The Future Impact of Fisher II on Affirmative Action
Litigation
Justice Kennedy concluded the opinion of the Court with a limitation:
the University has an ongoing obligation to continually reevaluate and
scrutinize its need to consider race in its admissions decisions.193 However,
it is ultimately left to universities—and not the courts—to strike the fragile
balance between conforming with the Equal Protection Clause and pursuing
the nation’s interest in promoting student body diversity.194 It would
appear, although not with crystal clarity, that courts will have difficulty
invalidating affirmative action programs in the future under the framework
set forth in Fisher II.195
Any university admissions policy being challenged in the future may
withstand a court’s constitutional review, so long as it can mimic the
University’s goals as outlined in Fisher II.196 Goals such as “promoting
cross-racial understanding . . .” and “preparing students for an increasingly
diverse workforce . . .” are sufficient under the Fisher II framework to
prove that a university’s decision to consider race in its admission policy
withstands strict scrutiny.197 Such goals, according to Justice Kennedy, fall
in line with the Court’s prior articulations of a university’s compelling
interest in achieving student body diversity.198 Because such goals are
constitutionally permissible, universities in the future can fall in line with
the University of Texas to survive constitutional scrutiny, citing to its own
evidence that, in its academic opinion, “critical mass” has not yet been
attained.199 Although the Court’s decision in Fisher II did not much—if at
all—change existing case law,200 the Court’s decision ensures that the life
expectancy of affirmative action programs in this country has been
extended, potentially indefinitely.201 For the time being, universities across
the country have been granted permission to continue to consider race in
admissions decisions.202

193. Id. at 2214-15.
194. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2214; see also Slattery, Symposium: A Disappointing Decision,
supra note 187.
195. See Taylor, Symposium: Extrapolating from Fisher, supra note 148; see also Henderson,
Symposium: What Proof Should We Demand, supra note 20 (stating that the Court “did not say in so
many words that the justices will bless virtually every racial preference plan that comes before them”).
196. See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2211.
197. See id.
198. Id.
199. See Slattery, Fisher v. UT-Austin, supra note 156, at 25.
200. See id.
201. Schnapper-Casteras, Symposium: Moving Forward, supra note 155; see Taylor, Symposium:
Extrapolating from Fisher, supra note 148.
202. See Slattery, Symposium: A Disappointing Decision, supra note 187.
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V. CONCLUSION
Fisher II expands further the already controversial topic of the
consideration of race in university admissions decisions.203 In upholding
the University’s race-conscious holistic review of its potential applicants,
the Court reaffirmed that a university’s pursuit of student body diversity
serves a compelling interest.204 The legacy that Fisher II leaves behind is
that ultimately, affirmative action programs are here to stay, expanding
Justice O’Connor’s prior expectation that such policies would no longer be
necessary within twenty-five years.205 Though the Court articulated in
Fisher II that a university admissions program must meet strict scrutiny and
be narrowly tailored,206 universities are required to be given “considerable
deference . . .” by reviewing courts in striking the balance between ensuring
the rights guaranteed by the Equal Protection Clause and pursuing the
educational benefits that flow from student body diversity.207 Thus, Fisher
II serves to give a university substantial leeway in determining for itself
whether the consideration of race is necessary in its admissions policies, and
in deciding how to implement such a policy in furthering its pursuit of
attaining student body diversity.208
CHRISTOPHER M. CALPIN
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204.
205.
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208.

See Glater, Debt, Merit, and Equity, supra note 2, at 93.
See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2211.
See Schnapper-Casteras, Symposium: Moving Forward, supra note 155.
See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2207-08.
Id. at 2214.
See id.; see also Schnapper-Casteras, Symposium: Moving Forward, supra note 155.
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